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Thinking Like A Lawyer:
Second Thoughts
by James I. Elkins*
I. ACQUIRING A LAW-TRAINED MIND
What does it mean to have a law-trained mind? What kind of
purposes and achievements are held out to those who seek schooling in
law? What kind of failures are associated with those who adopt a legal
mind-set? What happens to the moral sensibilities of those who follow
the path of teachers who claim to teach you to "think like a lawyer"?1
How does a law education shape one's ethics and how is this education
put to work in the practice of law? What do we become as a result of an
education in law? These are difficult questions because they are at once
simple and complex. The questions may look simple, but simple,
straightforward, noncontroversial answers are not readily forthcoming.'
When we try to say exactly what qualities we want those with a "legal
education" to have (using quotation marks now to indicate that we are
trying to be self-conscious about matters that we rarely consider) we find
ourselves facing a set of questions that do not lend themselves to simple
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University School of Law. University of Kentucky
(BA., 1967; J.D., 1971); Yale Law School (LL.M., 1975).
1. The difference between an education in law, from the teacher's perspective, and an
education in law, from the student's perspective, is worked out by way of a "hidden
curriculum." Many of the lasting lessons taught are implicit. The moral lessons of legal
education are most often of the implicit kind.
2. What is a law school? Few would argue it is a building. We are more likely to say
of law school that it is a place of education. Even with so simple a statement we move
from consensus to complexity and disagreement.
On first appearance, the goal of legal education, seems to be obvious. A law school is
an educational institution that provides an education to those who seek to become lawyers.
The goal of a law school is to educate and train lawyers to be effective, competent
professionals in their work. The graduates of a law school are expected to have law-trained
minds. The stated goal belies the contested terrain on which each premise of the goal is
founded.
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answers. We have different kinds of education in mind when we speak
of "legal education." It is a matter of continuing concern among some
law teachers that legal education should involve qualities that set it off
from vocational or on-the-job training.
Defining the goal of the law school and how this goal is achieved is a
good place to start. One might say the goal is to educate lawyers.
Calling anything education makes reference to historically defined
practices and problems, struggles and resolutions. Legal education, like
all education, is contested terrain.
Many, if not most, law teachers will define the goal of law school
without resorting to metaphysics. How do they do it? An often repeated
statement, one sufficiently common to have become a clichd among law
teachers, is that we teach our students to "think like lawyers." I want
to explore whether this is an appropriate goal for a law school teacher;
a goal worth trying to achieve, a goal worthy of the law school as an
institution of learning, a goal appropriate to those who view themselves
as educators.
The idea that our goal is to teach students to "think like a lawyer" has
a weighty history and consequently deserves to be taken seriously. We
can assume that a colleague who resorts to such an expression is trying
to say what she does and to use conventions of speech and expression
that will be readily understood. The assumption is, of course, that we
all know how lawyers think and how an education can be turned to the
purpose of forming a legal mind. The underlying, unexamined assumption is that lawyers think in a particular and stylized way that is worth
passing on as an essential part of legal craft and heritage.
One wants to believe that something of value is produced when we
teach law students "to think like lawyers." But when we subject the
multiple assumptions built into this stock, conventional notion to the
kind of inquiry that Socrates would have conducted (at least as his
inquiries are passed on to us in Plato's versions of the Socratic dialogues), the notion may turn out to be more puzzling, confused,
contradictory, mistaken, or incoherent than it first appeared.
II. A QUALITY OF MIND CALLED SERIOUSNESS
The law is a serious business. Those who practice law are expected to
be mature, serious, careful, and thoughtful adults. There is generally
too much at stake to be lighthearted about legal work. Those who seek
out lawyers are usually troubled in some serious way: some clients are
in pain, others grieve, and still others experience intense anger or rage
at the harm or wrong that has befallen them. Lawyers, like physicians,
deal with human suffering, and lawyers must therefore be aware of the
seriousness of the client's cause and that the outcome matters (indeed
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it may seem to the client, and perhaps even to the lawyer, to be all that
matters).3
Many law teachers have practiced law, whether in a legal aid office or
a large urban law firm, giving them first hand knowledge of the
seriousness of legal work. Knowing that lawyering work is serious
business, law teachers set out to impress upon students the responsibility associated with legal work. We do this by explicit exhortations, in
and out of the classroom, and perhaps more importantly, by the attitude
and cast of mind (what might be called a "character of mind") we bring
to classroom discussions.4
There is yet another way in which law teachers take their teaching
and their relationship with students seriously. Virtually every student
admitted to law school is capable of learning enough legal rules and
enough about how to apply these rules to make his way into the
profession. Most law teachers would argue that passing examinations
is not enough. There is a character of mind, a seriousness of purpose,
and a desire for competence found in better students that draws the
attention and admiration of law school professors.
The serious nature of the teaching enterprise is also reflected in the
idea that good teaching and good learning can be identified. Students
and teachers share a mutual concern about Quality5 in the mastery of
lawyering skills. Law teachers, I would argue, care about how things
are done because they know that law, when practiced well, requires a
close attention to detail, precision, and clarity. The way a lawyer works
and the care with which she crafts a legal brief or a courtroom argument

3. This brief, highly selective description of the work of lawyers does not mean that
lawyers do not, like other professionals, "play" in their work, or that humor does not make
its way into the law office and the courtroom.

4. I use the term "we" when I talk about the serious cast of a law-mind and the
teaching that follows from this seriousness. I use "we" with some trepidation, knowing that
law teaching is not a homogeneous activity, that all teaching is political and that our
politics differ, and that our politics show up as fundamental differences about the basic role
of lawyers and future of law in our society. I use the term "we" to imply that law teachers

comprise a community. I think we can talk about law teachers in the sense of a common
"we," in the same way that we can talk about judges, lawyers, doctors, or nurses. I
assume, for the moment, that there is enough common ground to make the use of"we" both
appropriate and provocative.
5. This essay is about Quality. One of the implicit, working features common to moral
and legal discourse is Quality. We need more sustained efforts to think about Quality and
how it works. See, e.g., TRACY KIDDER, HOUSE (Houghton Mifflin 1985) (exploring the
Quality of builders and architects) and ROBERT PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE
MAINTENANCE: AN INQUIRY INTO VALUES (William Morrow 1974) (on the philosophical basis
of Quality).
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are essential .to producing a quality product. Law teachers admire
quality and seek to instill it in their students.
This seriousness of purpose causes law teachers to expect a great deal
of students. We expect students to develop a quality of mind that tracks
the seriousness of law and its consequences, based on the assumption
that only with serious, rigorous effort can one attain the skills necessary
to be competent and professional in the practice of law. When we
impress upon students the value and the difficulty of what we ask them
to do, the student begins to see that there is more to being a lawyer than
meets the eye. Being a lawyer involves more than going to law school,
learning how to read judicial opinions, and making arguments before
judges.
Learning the basics of law, as many law teachers will admit, is a
relatively simple matter. We could, if we focused on the mechanics of
learning, teach the basics of law in one year rather than three.
However, most law teachers will not admit that their teaching is limited
to conveying information about substantive legal rules. They assert that
teaching constitutes more than the transmission of substantive law and
legal principles. Law teachers who believe they are doing something
more than teaching legal rules may have some or all of the following
notions in mind:
(i) Learning the law is simple, understanding the law is difficult.
Knowledge of the law must be combined with skills of performance
(reading, writing, argumentation, negotiation, counseling, rhetoric and
narration) and it is in the interplay of knowledge and skilled performance that mastery becomes difficult.6
(ii) Law and its practice has both a public and private dimension.
Some of our work is done in public view, while other aspects are
surrounded by a contract and covenant of confidentiality. In this sense,
the practice of law is like a restaurant. The food is eaten by patrons in
the public dining area, but the real "work" of a restaurant is done behind
closed doors. Serious law teachers are concerned about what goes on
behind closed doors.
(iii) Law, and the practice of law, involves more than law schools now
teach, or one might argue, even attempt to teach. Law is closely related,
by even the most superficial of observations, to society and those who
hold the reins of power. Yet, law schools do not attempt to teach
students how to deal with power and those who wield it. 7 Law schools

6. For a practicum on mastery, see GEORGE LEONARD, MASTERY: THE KEYS TO LONGTERM SUCCESS AND FULFILLMENT (1991).
7. There is, it is true, some talk of making arguments to public policy makers. We do
teach our students, albeit in a limited fashion, how to deal with the formal power ofjudges.
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do not, with notable exceptions, attempt to teach how the power of law
is used to maintain a particular social order and what the alternatives
to the prevailing order might exist.
(iv) Every law school probably has teachers who puzzle over the
troubled relation of law and justice with students, but students know
that the "justice agenda" is not what law school is all about. While law
implicates justice, the implications are often assumed to be beyond the
limits of what law schools can, or should, try to teach.
When we teach students to "think like a lawyer" we do not set out to
do an easy thing. The qualities of mind of the good lawyer are difficult
to acquire and difficult, sometimes impossible, to teach. To say that
what we do is not a simple task, that it has difficulties and complexities,
twists and turns that are not easily reduced to programmed learning,
means that the teacher makes an appeal to the subtlety and magnitude
of what can and should be done in the name of education. If there is
more to legal education and "legal thinking" than legal rules, the serious
teacher will seek to be aware of it and make her students aware of it.
III.

FROM SERIOUSNESS TO ILLUSION

Law teachers who seek to teach their students to "think like lawyers"
should be honest with their students: legal thinking may not be a
distinctive form of thought, and to the extent that it is a distinctive way
of thinking, it may be a dangerous one. Law teachers who teach "legal
thinking" should warn their students of the known hazards of legalistic
thinking. When law teachers fail to warn their students about the
questionable nature, limits, and dangers of "legal thinking," they lead
them astray.
Sanford Levinson has suggested that although one is tempted to
dismiss "learning to think like a lawyer," as "ritual cant," the idea is
actually "central to the ideology of legal education."8 Thus, thinking
like a lawyer is vested with far too much meaning to treat it in a
dismissive way.
Levinson makes clear that exploring the meaning of the expression is
not without difficulties. Levinson questions the assumption that legal
education fosters a single, unitary, autonomous mode of thinking. Law
professors are no longer dominated, Levinson contends, by a unidimensional, positivistic, case-oriented, legalistic worldview. Indeed, Levinson
points out that even the judicial opinions presented to students reflect
diverse modes of thought:

8. Sanford Levinson, Book Review, Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on "ThinkingLike
a Lawyer," 30 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (1978).
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For instance, one type of "thinking like a lawyer" is illustrated by the
opinions of Roger Traynor, who has helped to revolutionize tort law by
applying the analytical techniques of modern economics, with its
emphasis on internalization of costs and efficient risk-spreading.
Traynor typifies the lawyer-judge as an effective public-policy maker,
for whom "thinking like a lawyer" is the ability to weave together
strands from economics, sociology or other preferred social sciences into
effective tools for managing social life in a complex modern society.
For Traynor the traditional order of examining rights and remedies
tends to be reversed; a right is sometimes found precisely because a
remedy can be designed.
Countering Traynor's model is the view that judges have no business
engaging in policy analysis: Their task, and presumably the task also
of lawyers who appear before the bench, is to articulate the basic legal
principles that will enable them to reach a proper adjudication between
the parties to a particular lawsuit. Ultimate social goals are no part
of this model of legal thinking. One starts thinking of remedies only
after determination is made that the plaintiff has been deprived of a
legal right.9
While Levinson accurately describes multiple perspectives on legal
thinking, students, one suspects, learn law in a more homogenized form.
Yes, law students are exposed to a variety of forms of thinking about
law. This does not mean that they hold in mind's eye Traynor and
non-Traynor approaches, or that law students are made aware that
multiple approaches to legal thinking exist and that lawyers consciously
(and unconsciously) choose between them. Students are not instructed
in the political and moral philosophies that accompany various
approaches to legal thinking. Too few Traynors sit on the bench and
teach in our law schools to make pluralistic legal thinking a reality for
most students. 10
Levinson's comments about diversity in the teaching of "legal
thinking" is a warning to the wise: the idea of legal thinking is not a

9. Id. at 1072 (footnotes omitted).
10. To learn what Traynor has to teach would require an education far different than
the education many law students receive. There are educational, social, political, and
psychological constraints that minimize the Traynors we have in legal education.
If legal thinking turns out to encompass diverse, complementary ways of seeing and
resolving problems, then the diversity of legal thinking would constitute a challenge to the
idea that to think like a lawyer one uses only "legal thinking" to solve problems. Whether
there is one or many ways to engage in legal thinking and legal discourse, the stories of
students suggest that something more than legal thinking is at stake in law school. To
listen to students describe their law school initiatory experience, what they are learning,
and what it means to them, one begins to wonder whether it is safe to view thinking like
a lawyer as the innocent, shorthand code for what is taking place.
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single way of thinking. More importantly, legal thinking may not be the
exclusive property of lawyers and to the extent that it is, it may not turn
out to work as well as we assume.
Some law teachers believe they know what to "think like a lawyer"
means. The injunction to "think like a lawyer" has meaning to the
student because law teachers are serious about their rhetorical claims.
The reality of the claim sets in when students come to believe that
thinking like a lawyer is different from ordinary thinking. We are
reminded of this distinction most clearly when students put the rhetoric
of law to work to compartmentalize legal and moral discourse. Leaving
the ranks of the uninitiated to become a lawyer, students learn to
believe in the reality of the proposition that we know what we are doing
when we think like lawyers.
One student described this belief as she learned it through her Torts
professor's explicit attempt to teach just this lesson:
In Torts class last year, Professor Lawson would sometimes force us to
examine a situation in the way we would have perceived it before
coming to law school. This was the scenario: Lawson would come off
the platform and saunter up to the front row. He'd put his foot up on
the front row desk, loosen his tie, and light up a cigarette. He'd
instruct us to think about this in the way we would have a year ago,
to forget the things we've learned since. "Picture yourself at a bar
discussing the law with some of the regular patrons. You're all having
a beer and talking about whether someone has grounds for a lawsuit
or not." The idea was to get you to admit that before you came to law
school you believed that a particular behavior would be illegal. "Of
course," he would say, "anyone would think that this action is illegal.
It has to be, doesn't it?" He'd look at you and smile reassuringly.
Everyone smiled back, tentatively at first and then confidently All
over the room, heads would be nodding in agreement. Then he would
lean forward, squint, point his finger and SHOUT, "Well, boys and
girls, that's not true. It is legal. They don't know over there at the bar
what is and isn't legal. And neither did you, before you came here.
That's why you came to law school. Those people who think something
is legal or illegal because it's right or wrong don't know what they're
talking about. They're practicing bar stool law.' Law school is where
you learn what the law is. This is where you find out what is and isn't
legal-what you can and can't do. What the law really is."
"Bar stool law" became the catch-phrase to describe that uneasy
feeling that something should be illegal, but you didn't quite know
why. Many of us came to law school with "bar stool ethics." Some
things are just wrong, immoral, and unethical. They're just plain
wrong and everyone knows they're wrong. After a short time in law
school, you find yourself defending the very things that in pre-law
school days you knew were immoral, unethical, and just plain wrong.
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But this is where we find out what is or isn't right. This is where we
find out what we as lawyers can and cannot do. Surely lawyers can't
do it if it isn't legal, or right, or ethical. Right?
Legal education, Professor Lawson teaches his students, is the place
where you find out what law is, the place you begin to distinguish law
from what bar stool pundits profess. Lawyers know the law, in contrast
to bar stool pundits who think they know the law. Becoming a lawyer
is a matter of dislodging' your bar stool ethics and the fuzzy thinking
that goes along with it. (Lawson teaches the seriousness of legal
discourse through dramatic metaphors.) Lawson also teaches that law
carries its own ethics and that those outside the law, bar stool pundits,
do not "know" law in the insider, serious way the lawyer must know it.
Central to Lawson's lesson is the idea that knowledge of law is reserved
for insiders; ethics comes into play when outsiders talk about law.
A now infamous experiment in social psychology conducted by Stanley
Milgram" presents an interesting perspective on the possibilities for a
student's independent judgment about legal thinking when confronted
with a strong authority figure like Lawson. Milgram brought unsuspecting persons into a room where they were introduced to a scientist/experimenter. The subject was told that another individual would
be asked a series of questions. If the individual's response was false, the
subject would be instructed to "punish" the individual by administering
what the subject falsely believed was a shock. During the course of the
experiment, the subject was instructed to shock the individual with
increased amounts of voltage. Milgram found that many subjects would
deliver what they believed to be fatal shocks simply because they were
instructed to do so by someone in "authority."12
While I do not mean to suggest that law school and Milgram's
experiment are analogous, law and legal discourse are prototypes of a
discourse of authority. Students commonly experience confusion and
anxiety during their first exposure to law school and are therefore
vulnerable to attempts to simplify the complexity of the world they are
about to enter. 3

11. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AuTHoRrTY 13-26 (1974). For a legal educator's
use of Milgram's experiment to explain the ethical responses of his students, see Steven

Hartwell, Moral Development, Ethical Conduct, and ClinicalEducation, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REV. 131, 143-44 (1990) (I have serious reservations about the Milgram-type experimentation reported by Hartwell and the author's interpretation of the moral stages of reasoning
reflected in some of the reported students' actions).

12. Id.
13. The search for a "nutshell," guide, outline, summary, or map is so common (and so
necessary) in legal education that we have come to accept the need and its perversions.
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The analogy between scientists/experimenters who give orders to
administer lethal shock and law teachers who help the student suspend
concepts of everyday thinking (e.g., their lay sense of justice) and adopt
the idea of legal thinking and an adversarial ethic of lawyering may be
a crude one, but one worth contemplation.14 The students who buy into
the idea of legal thinking assume that thinking like a lawyer is part of
an idealized professional self-image, a prominent feature of a desired
legal persona, and an essential ingredient for success. Thinking like a
lawyer, ephemeral as it is, becomes a part of one's thinking and one's
moral universe.
Law teachers advance "legal thinking" by teaching their students that
everyday thinking is inadequate and that images of law held by
outsiders are naiv6. These teachers abhor "fuzzy," soft thinking (and
tender feelings, or for that matter, emotions generally) and romantic
views of the world. Thus, students are encouraged to abandon their
fuzzy notions about human nature, society, and justice. (Fuzzy being
defined as unrealistic ideals that one cannot hope to achieve in our
society or that society will not permit to be achieved). This powerful
myth, of law holding together an imperfect world, gains acceptability
because it fits with a student's need to be "realistic'-to finally put aside
naivet6 and romantic, idealistic thinking that has survived years of
schooling, experience, and work. Law teachers devoted to "legal
thinking" believe that with the use of the case-method and so-called
Socratic teaching, they shake up their student's fuzzy thinking by
requiring them to focus on a new reality, an order imposed by law.
Under this view, law school is good reality training. Law, for students
without a strong grip on reality, or pre-existing firm ideals, find in law
both reality and ideal.
IV.

MAKING LEGAL DISCOURSE REAL

Professor Lawson's lesson, crude as it may be, is what every traditional law teacher teaches; that law has its own language, methods, and way
of thinking. Students begin learning this lesson the first day of law

14. I do not mean to suggest that it is on the sole authority of teachers who think they
are teaching legal thinking that a student suspends everyday thinking. A student must
be "ready" for legal education and accompanying changes in moral sensibilities for legal

education to "fit"and take hold in the psyche. There are other "authorities" that make the
fit possible: the authority of formal education, the authority of media images of lawyers,
and the authority of our own purposes and needs shaped by culture and social and political
ideologies. There are, for reflective students and lawyers, also opposing authority,
authority found in legal education, prior schooling, and popular culture that warns against
"thinking like a lawyer."
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school and continue to learn it until the day they depart law school. The
story of legal education is the story of how one learns legal discourse,
and how the world and its problems can be seen through the prism of
linguistic categories and rhetorical strategies known to law. Seeing the
world in this way is relatively easy, and with encouragement and time
(always a problem), the student begins to learn the skill of legal
discourse.
The student's first assignment-to read a series of judicial opinions-is
an introduction to legal discourse.'5 The teacher asks, "What are the
facts of the case?" The student-some quickly, some painfully-learns
that some facts are relevant and that others are not, distinguishing that
which belongs to law from that which does not."6 In many ways the
lesson is no different than one taught to small children: This stove is
hot. Hot is different from cold. In this way the child is taught the
difference between hot and cold. Legal education too, begins in a simple
and rudimentary way, but the lesson can be subtle and powerful. The
act of selection, of seeing and valuing "facts" that count toward a judge's
decision, while dismissing other facts that will not count, is an act of
perception, at first simple, then complex and profound.17
Legal education begins in this simple, subtle, and powerful act of
selection, of seeing and valuing facts that count toward a decision, while
dismissing those facts that do not count. This lesson is taught as a legal
one, but it is equally a moral one. It is a lesson that ends up being
fought over in the classroom when we take up moral discourse as a
corrective to a narrow, one-dimensional version of legal discourse
practiced as single-minded devotion to an adversarial ethic. Thus, the
first lesson of legal discourse is simple, like learning the difference
between hot and cold, and complex, like learning the difference between
right and wrong.
Next, without reference to the implications for one's moral sensibilities
in the discovery of law-relevant facts, the student is taught that each
case has a holding. To find the holding of the case is to learn that each
case stands for something: a rule or principle of law. The search for the
rule of the case, like the search for the facts, involves paring away
nonessentials until one is left with a simple, unadorned, and descriptive

15. For an earlier presentation of these fundamental rudiments of legal discourse, see
James R. Elkins, MoralDiscourseand Legalism in Legal Education,32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11
(1982).
16. Even the most simple matter of "reading," something we already know how to do,
must be done in a special way if one is to gain approval of teachers of legal discourse.

17. The act of selection, of seeing and valuing "facts' that count toward a judge's
decision, while dismissing other facts that will not count, is an act of perception that can

become old hat, but when first encountered is complex, if not downright mystifying.
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statement, sufficiently general in nature to be applicable to future,
particularized, conflict situations.
The law student learns that isolating this authoritative holding
statement is not an easy task. Sometimes the judge in the case opinion
will say explicitly the rule or holding of the case. Law teachers confound
their students by showing that the judge's statement of the legal rule of
the case is not necessarily a good one and cannot always be trusted. In
this instance, the law teacher seeks to move the student from a simple
view of law to a more complex one.
Since there are different possible readings or interpretations of the
case, finding the rule of the case is an art. The implicit lesson in the
search for holdings, and for law itself, is that law presents a surface, but
meaning is more elusive. At a still deeper level, the student is
confronted with the idea that law is not always definitive and readily
knowable. The apparent ease with which we resort to loose language
about "the law" disguises an underlying anxiety about its uncertainty.
As the various lessons in legal discourse follow one upon another, a
tension appears in the study of law as the student moves between poles
(the poles themselves
constantly moving and shifting) of certainty and
18
uncertainty.
Learning how some facts are relevant to law and how some are not,
and that a judicial opinion has authoritative weight in the future, sets
the stage for an education in legal discourse. Through legal discourse
one acquires the intellectual attributes associated with a legal mind: the
ability to ground legal pronouncements in the "facts"; the ability to
discern fact and opinion that is significant for judicial decision-making;
the ability to argue a position and urge an outcome based on selection
of facts and interpretation of legal opinion; and the belief that judicial

18. Donald Sch~n, in his study of how professionals think, argues that every view of
professional practice "represents a way of functioning in situations of indeterminancy and
value conflict" and that our present state of knowledge requires professions to choose
"among competing paradigms of practice." DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTrriONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 17 (Basic Books 1983). The claim that

professionals operate from a positivist stance of technical rationality is challenged by
real-world professional practice.
In real world practice, problems do not present themselves to the practitioner as
given. They must be constructed from the materials of problematic situations
which are puzzling, troubling, and uncertain. In order to convert a problematic
situation to a problem, a practitioner must do a certain amount ofwork. He must

make sense of an uncertain situation that initially makes no sense.
Id. at 19. In the adoption of legal thinking other tensions begin to appear: between the
technical apparatus of law and the fair application of law, between law and justice,
between the reality of law and the ideals expressed in law, and between law as a set of
objective rules and law as means of service to those who need help.
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opinions establish the "law." These abilities bring with them the sense
that the student has deepened her ability to reason, advocate, counsel,
defend, and legislate. When this education takes hold, the student feels
more sensible, objective, rational, and purposeful. The student believes
she has become a person capable of "legal thinking."
***

The complaints about the results of an education in legal discourse are
widespread. We do not, for the most part, consider it an accolade to be
called legalistic."9 When thinking like a lawyer is invested with crude
meaning, as a syndrome, a map, a miniature worldview, or a simplified
amoral adversarialism, the result is injustice. Legal discourse becomes
a route to injustice when we allow its functional operation to crowd out
the political, social, philosophical, and spiritual perspectives that legal
education teaches us to push to the margins of legal discourse.0
Therefore, the basic lessons in legal discourse conveyed in the first
weeks and months of legal education have implications for how we
imagine our ethics as lawyers. One student, near the end of her legal

19. Legalism is a practical, as well as social and political problem. The sense of
omnipotence we teach our students (both explicitly and covertly) is directly related to the
fact that law is so pervasive in our culture. We teach omnipotence indirectly when we
teach law as an independent, autonomous discipline that has no regard for its neighbor
disciplines. We teach omnipotence indirectly when we hold out arrogance as a virtue. We
teach omnipotence indirectly in a dozen different ways, from the first day of law school
until the last.
When legal discourse is viewed as autonomous and independent of other social
institutions-divorced from economics, politics, history, sociology, psychology, and
separated from its moral and ethical foundations-legal thinking is transformed into
legalism and moral discourse is driven to the far margins of consciousness and concern.
20. Thomas Shaffer reports the following classroom incident which provides an example
of how moral discourse and legal discourse are conflated:
Professor: Brown, what's a trial?
Brown: An adversary proceeding.
Professor: For what purpose?
Brown: To discover the truth. (There is silence in large class for five seconds, then
laughter.)
Professor: (after waiting just long enough for the laughter to help him make his
point): Who cares what truth is?
Brown: I care. (Loud laughter.)
Professor: Well, in your conversations with God, you can take those questions further.
(Pause. Then, to another student) Smith, what's the purpose of trial?
Shaffer, Moral Moments in Law School, 4 SOc. REsP.: JOURNALISM, LAW, MED. 32,33-34
(L. Hodges, ed., 1978), reprintedin THOMAS SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN LAWYER: LAW
FOR THE INNOcENT 165-76 (1981). The exchange that Professor Shaffer reports between
one law student and one law professor might on first appearance be viewed as unusual and
idiosyncratic. I suspect that it is not. Virtually every law student has a similar story to
tell when they recount their own rites of passage in law school.
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education, reflected on the relationship between moral and legal
discourse:
I am only now beginning to see what it means to "think like a lawyer."
It's not always meant as a compliment, is it? There really is a certain
mindset which one adopts and then adapts to in the legal environment.
It struck me as curious when students tried to define moral dilemmas
in legalistic terms. It seemed to make everyone more comfortable in
solving them with reasoned but dispassionate answers that fit into
some legal classification governed by some legal principle. 2
Students feel a wonderful sense of achievement when they learn to
think the way their teachers think, the way they have been asked to
think, but it is not, as this student reflects, "always meant as a
compliment" if what one learns is to think like a lawyer. Legal discourse
is the key to thinking for successful, competitive students and they are,
as another student observes, "the first to adopt a legalistic approach to
all phases of life." The end result of this process is that legal thinking
becomes a worldview.22
V. PREVAILING REALITY

To appropriate an identity for oneself out of the ongoing cacophony of
legal education is difficult. The story of legal education from which you
begin to construct a professional identity and a future begins like an
ancient Greek drama, with much of the action having taken place before
the play begins.2" However, the real story of "legal thinking" takes

21. The same student commented on her puzzlement "when books and library
assignments suddenly became the most important thing in this world, especially to
students who declared they didn't like competition." She goes on to say
I vividly remember torts and criminal law classes during my first semester.
Doggedly dissecting violent murder cases and tragic accident cases with the same

cold precision, the professors "got through the material." Strict analysis and
cynical attitudes seemed to be the goals of the students. Professors demanded the
holding of the case and logical analysis and got it. Since we were taught to be
valueless and scientific in our first year, it is almost impossible to resist the

temptation to use this logic and technique to make moral choices or not to make
them at all.

22. We now think like lawyers without quotation marks. The absence of quotation
marks indicates that a way of thinking is now habit, done without conscious concern.

23. Legal education takes place within the context of stories, stories you bring with you
to law school, and stories about legal education told by teachers. There are various stories
told about law and how law works. With all these stories floating about, told and retold
on every possible occasion, it is still possible, when you become a student of law, to feel like

you have entered a medieval fortress, a world unto itself.
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place in the law school classroom in the methods used to teach close
reading of judicial opinions.
The rigors and cynicism of classroom conversation between teacher
and student follows a perverted version of a Socratic dialogue. At first,
students find the method exciting, but also confusing and a bit
mystifying. Some find law teachers electrifying, but over months of
study, the mystery of the case-method is expelled and the law school
version of the Socratic method gives way to boredom.
Law students enter and leave law school without learning much, if
anything, about the patron saints of legal education: Christopher
Columbus Langdell, and Socrates. Law students hear nothing of
Socrates, what kind of man he was, what kind of teacher he was, and
why he taught the way he did, or how he died. Although law teachers
identify Socrates as their patron, most have not read Plato's accounts of
Socrates. They claim affinity with Socrates, without themselves knowing
who Socrates was and what kind of teaching he embraced. To compound
the irony, these same teachers pride themselves in Socratic questioning
and readily adopt other practices (e.g., in their testing and in their
relation to students) antithetical to Socratic teaching. Thus, what most
teachers mean by the Socratic method is that they ask students
questions.2 4
Both law teachers and students make an effort to keep legal education
as simple as possible. Maintaining this simplicity requires some work
when the tension between simplicity based on practical concerns collides
with those who have a hopeful view (seeing in law the means to an ideal
society).2" Modern law teachers advance a pragmatist view through
proficiency in problem-solving skills. In the practical skills of reading
cases, writing legal documents and briefs, and making arguments, both
teacher and student take pride.
The controlling ideology and dominant narrative in legal education
mediates the conflicted life of one caught between practical realities and
the promise of law as a foundation for a democratic and just society.
The tension, seldom explicitly expressed but always present, sets up the
opposition between law practiced as a set of practical skills and law as
an expression of lived ideals. The implicit lesson of the failure to
address this tension in legal discourse is uncertainty-the feeling that
law strands us between two moving, unstable polarities.

24. For an account of law school teaching true to the spirit of Socrates' teaching, see
Thomas D. Eisele, Bitter Knowledge: Socrates and Teaching by Disillusionment, 45
MERCER L. REV. 587 (1994).

25. For an extended treatment of the real/ideal tension in legal education, see James
R. Elkins, The Paradoxof a Life in Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 129 (1979).
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Legal education is further unsettled by social context: the public does
not hold the legal profession in high regard, and there are ample news
accounts reporting the decline of professionalism in law practice. Law
students must, therefore, reconcile legal thinking the legal professor
demands of them with accounts of how lawyers make a mess of things
in their community and in their own professional life. The pacifying
logic for this incongruence of public regard and professionally approved
way of thinking goes something like this: The lawyers who go astray are
a minority. They did not learn their bad ways in law school. Law is a
tool that can be used for bad or for good. Law schools cannot teach
virtue and should not try. Legal education takes place in society and
therefore, cannot create a bastion of decency and honor in a world where
these virtues have become secondary. The important thing to remember
is that most lawyers do more good than harm. The public lashing out
at lawyers is misdirected because the public does not understand
lawyers and their role in society. Lawyers have historically been vilified,
and that they will continue to be held in disdain should not disturb us.
Lawyers live in a world of conflict, a world where literally two sides exist
to every story. You can fuss around about truth all you want, but
lawyers know or learn that truth is elusive. Therefore, one can easily
understand why lawyers are not popular with the general public. As
lawyers, we should not be overly concerned by our lack of popularity.
This rhetoric, or some version of it, permeates the law student's effort
to explain the tensions in her life as a legal actor. The rhetoric justifies
legal education and even purports humility. Mischievous in its modesty,
the claim also makes legal education highly resistant to change. The
significance of this rhetoric is that it already contains a beginning and
an ending that frame, and hence, enable us to interpret the present. It
is not that we initially have a body of data, the facts, and we then
construct a story or a theory to account for them. Rather, the rhetoric
of justification is itself the outlines of a narrative structure that
establishes what is to count as data.26
In legal education, the dominant rhetoric depends upon stories that
justify legal discourse. Legal discourse requires that law teachers get
bar stool law and ethics out of the heads of their students so they can
learn to think like a lawyer. Before new narratives and new meanings
can be found in legal education, it will be necessary to see how the
dominant ideology and rhetoric of legal thinking is established, and who
it works for, and who it works against.

26. See Edward M. Bruner, Ethnography as Narrative, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
EXPERIENCE 139-55, at 142-43 (V. Turner & E. Bruner eds.,

,1986).
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Law teachers, some more consciously than others, make explicit their
goal of teaching the student to think like a lawyer. If the goal is to be
adopted by the student, if it is to be more than pedagogical whimsy, then
the rhetoric must be reinforced with powerful stories and metaphors.
The teacher must be able to convince an audience of students that
thinking like a lawyer is different from what an uninitiated lay person
does. The moral lesson that Professor Lawson teaches about "what law
really is" and how law is confused by bar stool ethics is the kind of
pedagogy (and the kind of legalism) that makes the rhetoric of legal
thinking real.
How can the law teacher ridicule what the student already knows
about law (and about the world)? The ideology and rhetoric of legalism
(legal thinking) takes root because it is more "realistic" than the
unarticulated and unfocused ideas and ideals so many students carry
with them into legal education. It does not matter to the teacher hellbent on teaching "legal thinking" that the student cares or knows
something worth knowing about the world. Legal thinking makes
personal spheres of caring irrelevant. Law teachers do not, of course,
directly teach that caring does not matter; rather they expect all caring
to be prefactored into law and legal thinking. Caring is left to the
legislature or the judge. Caring gets in the way of law; it impedes the
manipulations and applications of law.
Law takes on objective reality when it announces itself as a form of
truth. The law as truth posits imperfections in law as demonstration
that law is an ideal, ever moving toward perfection while never reaching
the destination. In law, we may not always get it right, but we are
better off, mistakes and all, than without it. Without law, flawed as it
may be, we would have anarchy and chaos. A world without law is a
world without order. In this brief defense of law, we see the making of
an ideology in which law becomes the shining embodiment of progress
and the most active, prominent, and established social force for a
progressive society. To question legal thinking and move against the
dominant legal ideology is to invite chaos.
VI.

AN ANTINOMIAN VIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION

There is another narrative, a different story, and a competing ideology
that offers what anthropologist Edward Bruner refers to as a "new
vocabulary, syntax, and meaning" for the study of law."

27. For an exploration of how different it turns out to be see BENJAMIN
SOUL OF THE LAW

(Element, 1994).

SELLS, THE
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The competing narrative is less a grand, all encompassing story of a
world in which a dominant ideology is encoded in the quest for an
elusive but privileged way of thinking, but a world framed in terms of
human success and failure. In writing about their experience of law
school, students often focus on aspects of their life that are driven
underground as they try to understand and master legal thinking. The
following excerpts from student writings make this point repeatedly:
(i)
school,
professors attempt to make you
year
of
law
In the first
believe cases and situations can be analyzed without regard to your
own or society's morals and ethics. After a while, students come to
view cases in this way: they learn to disregard their own feelings.
(ii)
Most law professors look askance at a student who relies on his
heart rather than his head. In one of my first-year classes, a
student backed up his position by saying, "Itjust seems right." The
professor replied, "You can get into trouble thinking like that."
(iii)
Law school changes one's way of thinking and viewing
problems. Someone said in class that law is a philosophical
profession. It could be, but generally it isn't. Law forces one to be
practical and realistic while at the same time stripping our idealism
away. It can form people into cold, calculated individuals.
(iv)
school,
I had no class in which a solitary
year
of
law
In the first
word was ever said about right or wrong, should or ought, or the
ethical responsibility of lawyers. Such matters are stuck away in a
course called Professional Responsibility.
Legal education imbues its victims with a sense of importance
of intellect, rationalism, and logic to the exclusion of feeling and
caring. When we become aware of emotional stirrings we immediately strike out to rid ourselves of the transgressor, the intruder in
our intellectual realm. We are unable to utilize both cognitive and
emotional skills. From the first day one attends his first law school
class, the relationship between head and heart is severed. We are
brainwashed into believing that education is neutral, and knowledge
can only be pursued and acquired when moral scrutiny and personal
values are quieted.
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Law school teaches a system of devices for promoting the
manipulation of power and people, not the development of character.
It is no wonder that my soul is so often a battlefield. To acknowledge emotion in law school is to invite pain. The refusal to become
an amoral technician is dangerous.
I am angry and disgusted with a legal education that attempts
to brainwash me into thinking like a lawyer and that is not at all
concerned with who I am as a person and what I bring to the
profession. Legal education is so unconcerned about who we are as
whole human beings that we sometimes forget about the whole
person that constitutes self.
I catch myself desiring to be a good player. I work hard at the
cases, try to understand what I am being taught, and struggle with
learning how to think. I fear this makes me part of the process I so
much despise.
(v)
The orchestration of the typical everyday class under the famed
"Socratic method" is nothing more than a barrier to understanding
the human aspects of the law. Under the Socratic method, students
are badgered, and in some cases completely humiliated by the
professor, in an attempt to make them think like lawyers. From
what I gather, thinking like alawyer means we deal with problems
in a finely tuned, rational manner. Emotional reaction to problems
is unnecessary, unwanted, irrelevant, and unlawyerlike. How the
rules and principles apply to people is unimportant.
(vi)
Thus far, legal education has gone to incredible lengths to
isolate us from our own beliefs and feelings. We are taught that it
is easy to take any case and disregard whether or not it is a "good
or bad" one. We are not permitted to have a personal belief in the
guilt or innocence of a client.
(vii)
In the beginning, you react, "that's just not right" or "that's
unfair." As a law student, you begin to set yourself apart from lay
persons and learn to think like a lawyer. When you do not think
like a lawyer, you are made to feel foolish and inadequate. There
is perhaps nothing so bad as saying what you feel.
As a law student, you can always disassociate yourself knowing
that what you are doing is not for real and you are just doing what
you have to in order to get through law school. As a lawyer, the
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problems become real, but you have become so used to disassociating
yourself with your moral/ethical self that you can no longer
distinguish the real you from the lawyer you. It is frightening.
These brief student commentaries on legal education suggest that legal
thinking becomes the basis for a legal world view that crowds out other
perspectives and ways of speaking, seeing, experiencing, and understanding the world. The ordinary progress of learning legal thinking
requires a "psychic numbing." The numbing blunts insight and blinds
us to the choices we make. We move through life, and law school, by
numbing ourselves to what goes on around us. We lose touch with the
center of our own existence, and the ideals and images which bring one
to law school are blocked, deflected, deformed.
When law teachers explain that they teach legal thinking, they rely
upon conventions that are thought to embrace all students and all
teachers. The conventional rhetoric and thought do not, however
adamant the claim, comport with the experience of all students, or all
law teachers. When law students reflect seriously on their initiation
into law, they provide a different, competing, antinomian perspective on
legal thinking.
The reality of legal thinking (the felt-sense that it is different from
ordinary thinking) is true enough to be plausible and plausible enough
to legitimatize itself in the classroom. But legal thinking also distorts
and deforms the lives of students (and no small number of law teachers)
in enough ways to make it less than the whole truth about becoming a
lawyer. Students of law know first-hand the cost of their initiation of
learning to think like a lawyer. In their underground, antinomian
narratives, students articulate what traditional legalists deny: legal
thinking is not the final prize. When we break through the dominant
ideology, we find stories that put legal discourse in a new light.2"
One need not look far to be reminded that legal thinking leads to
legalism. Driven by legalism we make a fetish of rules and view with
suspicion those ideals and beliefs rules can never fully embrace. The
problem with legalism is that it shuts out moral, political, and social
discourse. It leads to a belief that legal skills are
synonymous with analytic power-the capacity to clarify complex
problems and communicate to others the range of choice open to those
in search of solutions ....

The legal system takes on the trappings of

28. Legal discourse does, it should be made clear, serve a variety of functional
purposes. A mode of discourse, law among them, permits one to speak of the world from
a particular perspective and is thus, a way of seeing and imagining the world.
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a kind of overall regulator in that it assures us of a single authoritative
rule for each dispute as well as an internally consistent system of
rules.29
As Stuart Scheingold notes "[legal education imparts a sense of efficacy
which leads to a belief in problem-solving abilities far beyond the
obvious skills learned in law school."' 0 One danger of legal thinking is
that it breeds arrogance. The domain of law extends to virtually every
realm of human activity and increasingly becomes the preferred way of
resolving conflict. The sense of the law's omnipotence easily extends to
the teachers and students of law (both explicitly and covertly) a process
directly related to the pervasive role of law and lawyers in our culture.
Beyond legal thinking, law teachers, in the seriousness they impart to
law and the qualities of mind essential to its practice, play a crucial role
in leading students to develop not only legal skills, but professional
identity. Inherent in the concept of professionalism is the sense that law
is more than an occupation and that one must develope an identity-a
particular kind of self-to be a professional. While law teachers are
influential in shaping this identity, they do not explicitly offer a program
for its formation. By listening to students and knowing something of
their stories, and the story of legal education as told from their
perspective, one comes to see identity as a function of concerns and
expectations, hopes and dreams, fears and failures.
The kind of lawyer the student becomes will be determined as much
by individual ideals and beliefs-the very ones law teachers studiously
ignore-as anything the law teacher does in teaching contracts or torts
or teaching the student to think like a lawyer. The values and beliefs
of a student and the conflicts they generate as they are lived out in the
world constitute a second level of formative influence that flows beneath
the traditional rhetoric and cover stories told in legal education.
Ann Scales offers a view of legal education that hints at how training
for legal thinking becomes ideology. Scales, a law teacher at the
University of New Mexico, writing with one of her students, describes
law school this way:
Law schools are like medieval monasteries. We seclude our novices
from the world, give them the sacred texts .... We give them ritual
incantations ... to perform when their faith flags. Unlike other
monasteries, however, we have no holy songs, for our faith holds that
everything significant can be said. Our students take the vow to think
like lawyers. As if in perpetual meditation, they must exclude from

29.
30.

STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTs 159 (1974).
Id. at 158.

1996]

THINKING LIKE A LAWYER

consciousness their prior lives and thoughts, their opinions, their
outrage. We provide no spiritual room for their doubts. If they
continue to have them, they will simply fail-in law school, and in the
profession. There is no way to impart the calling to those who are not
blessed. The exam will tell whether the incantations are working or
whether they are tainted by doubt.31
Scales directs attention to the dominant ideology of legal education
conveyed by stories directed from the front of the classroom by those
teachers with whom students identify and associate their future
success.32 The story that Ann Scales excavates is a story found in
students' reflective writings, 3 a story told outside the classroom.
Scales seeks out a story told only as it is encoded in classroom silence,
a story told away from the hearing (and the teaching) of law professors-a back of the bus story. (It matters, as any traveler will tell you,
where you sit on the bus. Getting the right seat in the right part of the
bus, on the side of the bus with the views, means all the difference.
Obviously, the experience is dramatically different for the driver and the
passenger.)
The relationship of the two narratives-one the highly-touted effort to
think like a lawyer and the other that of students who suffer the
dominant ideology and experience its limits first hand-is driving apart
with neither student nor teacher finding an opportunity to address them
as left and right hand of the same body. For one who stands in front of
the room, as I do when I teach, it is difficult to find ways to hear and
then understand the second. The question is whether law teachers can
ever be persuaded to bracket their own justifying rhetoric long enough
to hear the stories of those who construct disputations accounts of what
it means to think like a lawyer. In listening for the antinomian
narratives of our students, the question is whether we will be willing to
turn these narratives into a critique of teaching legal thinking.'"

31. Karl Johnson & Ann Scales, An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Reasons
Why We Sing, 16 N.M. L. REV. 433, 438-39 (1986).
32. For one version of the law school success story, see Calvin Woodard, Progressand
Poverty in Law and Legal Education,37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 795, 797 (1986) ("The law of the
contemporary law school has become ... one of the richest textured, most sophisticated
subjects in the world of higher learning.") (arguing that legal education is both a story of

progress and poverty, but that the poverty ascribed to American legal education is more
apparent than real).
33. On the use of reflective, instrospective writing in legal education, see James R.

Elkins, Writing Our Lives: Making Introspective Writing a Part of Legal Education, 29
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 45 (1993).

34. It may be difficult but it is not beyond doing. See, e.g., C. ROLAND CHRISTENSEN,
DAVID A. GARvIN & ANN SWEET (EDS.), EDUCATION FOR JUDGMENT: THE ARTISTRY OF
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LAW-MIND AND MORAL DISCOURSE

We are pulled first one way and then another when we try to think
about the moral dimension of legal education. On one hand, it' is
increasingly difficult to find anyone who claims that legal education does
not have a moral dimension and that law schools must attempt, in some
fashion, to teach ethics as well as law.3" The recognition that lawyers
need ethics is countered by a strand of thinking in legal education, going
back to Holmes and Langdell, that we can and should teach, talk, and
think about law as if it were an autonomous discipline independent of
6
moral concerns.1
Holmes, in his classic work, THE PATH OF THE LAW, writes:
For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every
word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether,
and other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by
anything outside the law ....
[Bly ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion
we should gain very much in the clearness of our
37
thought.
Holmes, in this instructive passage, may not be arguing that law is,
or can ever be, separate from morality, but his lament over the failure
to successfully separate law and morality for the purpose of "a right
study and mastery of the law as a business with well understood limits,
a body of dogma enclosed within definite lines"38 lingers in our imaginations and brings confusion to our efforts to understand the moral
context of legal education. Holmes' desire to banish moral language
from legal education is shared by many legal educators today. They feel,
with Holmes, that law and morality considered together results in
"confusion--a confusion that impedes "clearness of our thought." The
assumption is that those who have the ability to think straight law have
an advantage over those who muddle law with thoughts of ethics.
Holmes, abetted by Christopher Columbus Langdell, godfather of legal
education and father of the law school case-method of instruction, feared
that the close relationship of the legal and moral perspective (legal and

DiscussIoN LEADERSHIP (Harvard Business School Press, 1991) (arguing that the second
narrative-the world of student learning-must be made an explicit part of teaching).
35. For a Socratic inspired response, see Thomas D. Eisele, Must Virtue Be Taught?,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495 (1987).
36. For an earlier effort to bring Holmes and Langdell back into the picture and explain
their role in contemporary legal education, see Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal
Education, supra note 17, at 31-35.
37. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. Rxv. 457, 464 (1897).
38. Id. at 459.

1996]

THINKING LIKE A LAWYER

533

moral language) would imperil the academic (scientific) study of law.
Holmes and Langdell sought a philosophical foundation and a pedagogy
that would make it possible to study law as if it could be temporarily
severed from the muddle of moral concerns. Holmes knew that what he
proposed was costly. To banish moral language from the study of law
will, he said, result in the loss of "the fossil records of a good deal of
history and the majesty got from ethical associations."3 ' A century
later, the relation of moral and legal discourse is still debated.
This Holmesian and Langdellian jurisprudential view can be
juxtaposed against decades of educational literature and theory,
including the scholarly literature on legal education, that claims all
education, including all professional education, to be a form of moral
education. Holmes asked us to assume, for the purpose of getting on
with the "business" of the study of law, that law could be studied
independent of its moral features. Holmes created an educational
"fiction." Like any fiction, a novel, or even one of those fictions we adopt
in our own lives,' we can ask: Is it "good" fiction? Does it "work"?
What can we do with the fiction that we could not do without it? Some
fictions are wonderful, useful, and necessary. Fictions find a place in the
most rational of activities. The law abounds with fiction and metaphor:
"free" speech; the corporation as person; and intent in criminal law.4 '
A fiction is a feature of reality and develops a life of its own. Many
novelists describe the characters in a novel as having developed, during
the course of the writing, a life of their own. We begin to speak and act
as if the fiction were etched on some remote god's list of necessary
things.
Fictions, both those in law and those in our lives, have a moral bent.
That is, they help us create and maintain an ordered moral universe.
A fiction is a metaphor, a useful cognitive bridge to get us from where
we are to where we think we want to be. The Holmesian/Langdellian
premise that morals make for muddled confusion in the study of law led
to still another fiction-that law could be studied as any other science.
The fiction of legal education without morals and ethics may have been
prudent rhetoric for the time in which it was espoused. The legacy of
this fictional premise-the continued necessity of a separation of legal
and moral language-has become more pernicious over time. The

39. Id. at 464.

40. For an interesting exploration of the fictions we live, see JOHN L.
IMAGINARY SOCIAL WORLDS (University of Nebraska Press, 1984).

CAUGHEY,

41. For a helpful, accessible account of metaphors and law, see Thomas Ross, Metaphor
and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053 (1989).
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separation of law and ethics is at once real and powerful, as it is
fictional, false, and impoverishing.
Following Holmes, one might imagine moral discourse in relation to
becoming a lawyer the way interior decorating is related to the building
of a house. You become a Holmesian lawyer like carpenters build a
house-from the ground up. When you lay the foundation you do not
worry about the roof, the tile floor in the bathroom, or the finish of the
interior walls. Those concerns wait for another day. For Holmes, moral
discourse in legal education is like the personal, idiosyncratic, and
subjective features that the occupants of a new house impose on the
underlying structural reality of their new dwelling.
The best builders are concerned that the house will be one the owners
will want to live in and take pride in inhabiting. This concern must be
present from the moment work begins.4 2 Someone must think about
how the house fits the contours of the land and how it will be positioned
so that windows can be placed for best effect. Building a house, one to
live in or a house of law, component by component from the ground up
may get the house built, but it may not be a house we want to live in.
Like the builder who fails to consider the homeowner, Holmes'
banishment of moral concerns from the study of law has created a
dysfunctional effort at compartmentalization.
Our language and
practices as lawyers and students of law are so thoroughly entwined and
entangled in moral concerns that ignoring their relation, or postponing
inquiry into moral concerns until the foundation of legal thought is
completed, distorts legal thinking and sets up lawyers for a host of
problems.4 An understanding of moral sensibilities in the practice of
law is not equivalent to interior decorating. We can no longer afford a
legal education that teaches students to think like lawyers without
engaging their moral imagination for what lies ahead. Moral discourse
should be an explicit focus of teaching in the earliest stages of legal
education. Law is not now, nor has it ever been, a disciple that can
survive without a moral bearing.
VIII. FICTION IN ACTION
The law school classroom is a laboratory of the legal mind. The legal
mind at work in the classroom is a functioning prototype of the legal
mind-set of future lawyers and law teachers. By looking closely at the

42. This element of subjectivity takes a decidedly moral turn as the building of the

house proceeds-a "turn" beautifully exemplified in Kidder, supra note 5.
43. On the pathologies found in contemporary legal life, see SELLS, supra note 27;
James R. Elkins, PathologizingProfessionalLife: Psycho-Literary Case Stories, 18 VT. L.
REV. 581 (1994).
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way students of law grapple with the language, rhetoric, psychology and
philosophy of moral discourse, one can see how law-trained minds work.
Consider as a preliminary, crude example the fact that many students
object, immediately and vehemently, to the use of the word "moral" when
they take up a study of legal ethics." Some students are willing to talk
about what law schools call ethics, but not about morals. Following
Holmes, some seek to minimize (if not banish) moral discourse from the
law school classroom.
Given the widespread uneasiness with the word moral, student
objections to moral discourse should be taken seriously.4 5
Some
students argue that ethics can and should be talked about, but not
morals. In this view, the use of the word moral, rather than the word
ethics, is objectionable. Students of law make the distinction of morals
and ethics sound simple:

(i)
Our morals are for the most part learned. What we need is an
education in ethics.
(ii)
Ethics to me are moral standards of a profession. When I
speak of morals, I think of personal morals or those standards
continuously developed by a person during his lifetime.
(iii)
I have difficulty in viewing ethics and morals as one and the
same ....
Morals are associated with religious beliefs, and ethics
are somehow more objective.
(iv)
I believe that morals are very personal, whereas ethics are the
morals of a profession or group. Ethics are not necessarily the
representation of the morals of the individual group members. They
are decided upon either expressly or by implication.

44. It is important to note that the objection takes place in the context of a law school
course on legal ethics. If we do not talk about the moral dimension of lawyering in legal
ethics, then where could such talk take place? In the law firm? Between client and
lawyer? One can indeed imagine ethics talk in a law firm and in a law office, but I know
of no argument or claim that it is more easily performed in those settings than in a law
school classroom.
45. For one inquiry into objections and obstacles to moral discourse in legal education,
see James R. Elkins, Symptoms Exposed When Legalists Engage in Moral Discourse:
Reflections on the Difficulties of Talking Ethics, 17 VT. L. REV. 353 (1993).
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(v)
To be ethical is to conform to a set of reasonably defined
standards. These standards are determined by an analysis of the
system under which one operates, particularly with respect to the
history and evolution of the system. To possess legal ethics, if that
is indeed possible, one must conform to the standards of the legal
system. Morality seems to go beyond the scope of the reasonably
defined standards. Morals, as opposed to ethics, are based more on
personal opinion.
(vi)
Ethics is the term which defines a set of principles which
provide guidance for what ought to be done. Some ethical considerations have evolved from religious notions, while others have
developed out of philosophical notions. Morals, on the other hand,
represent a set of personal values, attitudes, and beliefs through
which the individual views the world in which he lives. Morals are
thus more particular to the individual. One's set of moral standards
determines how one views his ethical responsibilities. Each person's
make-up affects the way in which he interprets certain principles.
The objections reveal something about the legal mind. The rhetoric in
these claims highlights how lawyer ethics divorces legal thinking from
the moral foundations we observe in everyday life. When lawyers
pursue ethics and not morals they put their moral imagination to work
in the most crude way. The distinction between morals and ethics leads
directly to
a compartmentalization between professional and personal
46
morality.
Holmes sought only to compartmentalize law and morality for the
purpose of the study of law. Students in legal ethics do it for the
purpose of the study of lawyer ethics! The Holmesian fiction of
banishment (compartmentalizing morality and law) is recast in yet
another fiction: that legal ethics can be engaged without reference to
our morals. There is a faulty, and potentially dangerous, logic in the
progression of distinctions here. The fiction, if once functional, becomes
a fiction both false and pernicious.

46. Some students of law, lawyers, and law teachers may be sufficiently trained in the
philosophy of positivism to argue that words like morals and ethics have no objective

meaning, and in the absence of objective meaning such words do not aid in the constructive
project of imagining how we are to live together with our diverse views and values. The
positivist objection to the language of morals and ethics is rarely made in the law school
classroom. It is not a conscious philosophy of positivism that grounds objections to the
word "moral," but the restrictive workings of legal thinking.
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The effort to distinguish morals and ethics, when challenged, is said
by those who make the distinction to be just a matter of semantics. This
defense attempts to shield the moral/ethics distinction from the
philosophical implications that accompany it. Unchallenged, the
distinction between personal morals and professional ethics has an
intuitive appeal which falters when subjected to analysis and reflection.
Such challenges make students uncomfortable by revealing adverse
implications lurking in a cherished and readily accepted convention.47
Like so many conventional premises of legal thinking, distinguishing
morals from ethics applies a brake to moral discourse and deters inquiry
into moral concerns. Thus, the legal mind, the mind devoted to legal
thinking, begins to look like the lord of a substantial manor.4
To talk about the legal mind at work, one must chart the ploys of a
legal mind framed by compartmentalization-a rhetoric and psychology
that puts legal ethics and personal morals at odds. The distinction
between morals and ethics is essential for those who split off their
character and common sense from the ethics they envision for them-

47. Thomas Eisele argues that when the law student's understanding of a law case is
subjected to Socratic challenge, the result is disillusionment. The insight that follows the
failures made known in Socratic dialogue leave us with "bitter knowledge." See Eisele,
supra note 24.
48. The following justifications for compartmentalizing personal morals and
professional ethics indicate the boundaries of the manor:'
(i) Morals are personal, private, and subjective. They are not matters for public
discussion, debate, and argument and are not an appropriate part of legal education.
Corollary:
The purpose of legal education is the pursuit of "objective" knowledge-knowledge that transcends subjectivity.
(ii) There is no meaningful way to talk about morals. Corollary: There is no common
ground-no common language for moral discourse. We will, when we talk ethics, waste our
time.
(iii) Each person has her own morals. Corollary: No one believes her moral point of view
to be mistaken or open to sustained questioning that could result in a different moral point
of view. Consequently, there is no reason to believe anyone will change her mind about
moral matters, and so we must leave personal morals as we find them.
(iv) Since there is no meaningful ("objective") way to talk about morals, moral discourse
can only lead to unproductive disagreement and conflict. Corollary: There is no way to
resolve true moral conflicts, and consequently the conflict we generate when we talk about
morals serves no useful purpose in the education of lawyers.
(v) The futility in talking about morals comes not only from the fact that we cannot
change another person's moral point of view, but from the fact that we get our morals
"growing up," which means they are embedded in "personality" and inaccessible to easy
examination. Corollary: It exposes too much of who we are as persons (and is thus,
embarrassing, painful, and produces too much guilt/shame) to engage in moral discourse.
(vi) Our education does not prepare us for moral discourse. Corollary: We do not have
the formal cognitive skills or public language to talk about morals the way we talk in the
classroom about legal matters.
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selves as lawyers. The distinction between morals and ethics is a
prelude to the tension and struggle over a set of contradictions: Person
and role; home. and office; law and justice; ordinary morals and
professional ethics.
.The distinction between morals and ethics offered by those who think
like lawyers raises a host of pedagogical and philosophical questions: .
-Is a professional's view of what is right and wrong a private matter
when the professional acts by public license on behalf of others?
-How do we mark the "personal" and the "public" for purposes of
public discourse?
-Do the morals and the constellation of character outside the law
office have any bearing in the law office?
-What moral concerns in the practice of law cannot be made
appropriate subjects of study and inquiry?
-Can the sole purpose of education be the learning of "objective"
knowledge?4 9
These questions are obscured in the ready rhetoric of law teachers who
claim to teach their students to think like lawyers. The notion that the
legal mind can be occupied solely by legal matters without reference to
moral concerns arises from a set of assumptions, philosophical premises,
and underlying theories of society that are shaped by personal,
educational, and cultural narratives that devalue moral concerns.
One danger of legal thinking is that we let our law-trained adversarial
minds do battle before the war begins. (The rhetoric of war is common
to lawyers and I use it here with that recognition.) We pick fights with
each other about moral matters without testing the nature and extent
of the common ground we might share. We assume that ethics talk and
moral discourse lead inevitably to serious, intractable moral disagreement. When the assumption becomes a reality, we have a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
We need ways to talk about lawyer morals and ethics that recognize
areas of moral disagreement and avoid the fictional banishment that
Holmes and Langdell practiced. One of the things we know about moral
discourse and ethics talk is that it takes us, all too quickly, into the
quicksand of controversy. Ethics talk introduces us, in a crude, abrupt
way, to the fear that we have no common ground-no place to stand
together; no way to think about or talk ethics-that will extend, expand,

49. My reading of scholarly literature on the philosophy of science, sociology of
knowledge, feminism, literary criticism, and jurisprudence suggests that all knowledge
begins and ends in subjectivity. Every body of knowledge is laced with subjectivity. For
two dramatically different accounts of this subjectivity, see MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT
DIMENSION (Anchor Books, 1967) and Pirsig, supra note 5.
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and deepen our understanding of our work and the moral dimensions of
our professional practices. This fear becomes manifest in the psycho-pedagogical conspiracy of law students and their teachers to confine the
study of lawyer ethics to a study of the profession's ethical rules. If we
can not banish moral discourse from legal education, we can transform
it into the kind of talk with which we are most familiar-law talk.
Looking for common ground is itself controversial. Consider, for
example, the long-standing dispute over what place moral discourse and
moral sensibilities have in legal education. It is difficult, although
possible, to imagine a legal profession and an education of lawyers
untainted with "moral" influence. Holmes encouraged the fantasy. Yet,
no one argues that lawyers can practice law without their "moral
sensibilities" intact, and indeed one of the current concerns about the
legal profession is that we have displaced far too much of our ethical
concerns during the course of our education as lawyers. If there are any
among us who do not have a regard for the civic and ethical responsibilities that lawyers assume and the necessity of a moral bearing to guide
us in seeing to these responsibilities, they tend to maintain their views
in silence. It is when we ask ourselves what we might do together as
students and teachers of law, to convey, educate, and empower moral
sensibilities (whatever they may turn out to be) that we slip dangerously
close to accepting the solace in Holmes' fiction.
I assume that the law teacher is always, by the nature of the
teaching, knee-deep in moral concerns. I think the vast majority of the
general public would agree that lawyers must concern themselves with
ethical matters, and when they do not they undermine our faith in the
hope of civic virtue. But put the matter to fellow law teachers and law
students, and they register alarm at the notion that anyone should
engage them in moral discourse. There are fears of dogmatism,
indoctrination, and absolutism.
In this Article, I present only one of several rhetorical moves of the
law-trained mind to bend law to fit a small box-a box that contains an
amoral approach to legal practice. I contend that a legal mind divorced
from ethical foundations is sheer folly. We compound the folly when we
talk and teach legal ethics as if it were simply another body of law-like
rules. Therefore, we must, if we are to help students survive the moral
numbing that accompanies law schooling, bring the "moral" and "ethical"
assumptions about who we are, how our lives work, and how we are
going to locate ourselves in the world as lawyers and as human beings
into their legal thinking. Excavation of assumptions about legal mind
and legal thinking is essential to the future well-being of lawyers who
know, if they know anything at all, that a legal mind is never enough in
the daily practice of law.
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EPILOGUE

We convey and inculcate some variety of moral and ethical sensibilities when we induce our students to take up legal thinking. We are
always teaching more than law when we teach students to think like
lawyers. The legal mind, devoted to a set of practices involving other
human beings, has a moral dimension.50
In answer to the question, "Is there such a thing as a value-free
education?," the unequivocal answer is no. When law teachers strive to
train students in the skills of interpretation, reading and applying rules
of law, writing legal briefs, and making arguments for clients before
legal tribunals, they teach an adversarial approach to justice, partisan
advocacy, and the use of law to resolve disputes and maintain order.
Law, even in this most narrow and conventional view, is a set of interrelated philosophical claims. In holding itself out as pragmatic, problemoriented, and antiphilosophical, it embodies a set of values and a way
(one way) of seeing the world. In seeing the world through the prism of
legal thinking we are asked to embrace a reality of law that cannot
account for law as an ideal. Even when legalism attempts the complete
banishment of moral concerns (as Holmes fantasized) there is an array
of ideals and ethical values left as residue.5 Consequently, legal
education is always moral education, better or worse for the moral
images and precepts found in its teaching.
Many students acquire a taste for professionalism and for the "special"
status that is conferred on those in our society who learn to think like
lawyers.52 Some will fall prey to legal thinking and the power it
confers. Others will try to retain as much of their old self and old ways
of thinking as possible. When the friends of law students tell them they
have changed, some are surprised, some are pleased and willing to admit

50. This point has been made most recently by CarrieJ. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law
Teacher Avoid Teaching Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUc. 3 (1991).
51. One meaning of array is to deck in finery; to adorn in splendid attire. One
convention of ethical thinking is that one's values and ethics are finery-the impressive
and splendid attire we use to clothe ourselves on special occasions.
52. The image that we are "special," set-apart members of an elite inner circle begins
with "selection" to be a student. The student knows that others have sought admission and
have been denied. I, the student's inner voice says, by merit of work, credentials,
persistence of conviction, and fate have become one of the chosen. The student is "marked"
by feeling and conviction that she has been chosen and is "special."
The shadow to this sense that one has been chosen and is special is that you are actually
an imposter. On lawyers and the imposter syndrome, see Sells, supra note 29, at 130-33.
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it. Some are concerned by the changes that have taken place to acquire
a legal mind.5"
Most students accept the moral transformation that takes place in
legal education because they assume it is necessary and integral to
preparation for the practice of law. It is, they are promised, the
profession, and the professionalism we demand of ourselves, that
requires that we learn to think, talk, and act like a lawyer. We learn
that the practice of law requires a legal mind and that we are entitled
to think highly of ourselves" when we put legal mind to use and avoid
old ways of thinking. If we are to understand the legal ethic and the
values expressed by lawyers and their legal minds, we must look
carefully at the rhetoric of law teachers who seek to teach students to
think like lawyers.

53. For a sampling of student expressions of concern in their acquisition of a legal
mind, see James R. Elkins, Becoming a Lawyer: The Transformationsof Self DuringLegal
Education, 66 SOUNDINGS 450 (1983).
54. The following speech by a Federal judge to law students at the University of Iowa
is an example of the kind of rhetoric that lends support to the felt-sense and growing belief
that law school provides the kind of education that can make you a better person in the
very process of making you into a lawyer. Judge Rosenn told the students:
My personal experience has been that the practice of law is an inspiring and
noble profession. Of course, there are some unprincipled and incompetent lawyers.
But for the most part lawyers are decent, dedicated, and honorable persons who
make an important and lasting contribution to society. Lawyers frequently plead
the causes of those who depend upon them for family, reputation, worldly goods,
and even life itself. They conscientiously and sincerely advocate and defend civil
rights and humanistic causes. They preserve confidences with utmost fidelity....
By and large, I believe the profession has made, and continues to make, a
meaningful contribution to government and society. The enormous multiplication
in the number of lawyers and the extraordinary growth of litigation in this
country seem to demonstrate that the public-individuals, business, and
industry-does have confidence in the legal profession and the administration of
justice, and that courts are readily accessible ....
Lawyers, educated in the humanities and history, trained in the power of analysis
of issues and the logical formulation and expression of ideas, are natural
community leaders ....
Your knowledge of philosophy, history, and literature, and your studies in the law,
have aptly prepared you for service in the larger world, with its moral and
humanitarian obligations.
Max Rosenn, The Social Conscience of a Lawyer, 69 IOWA L. REV. 319, 321, 322, 324, 326
(1984).
With moral sugar plumbs like those offered by Judge Rosenn dancing in their heads,
students learn to accept as function and necessary the rituals of legal education. Others
find little to celebrate in their law school rites of passage and eagerly await the day when
law school rituals can be put to the test in the practice of law.

